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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PILLSBURY MILLS, INC., 
A Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
XEPHI PROCESSING PLANT, INC., A 
Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
and 
LAFE .MORLEY and CALLIE MORLEY, 
his wife, 
Oross-( )omplainants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8723 
RRIFJF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff and respondent, Pillsbury Mills, lnc., A 
Corporation, is a manufacturer and seller of turkey feedH 
at Ogden, Utah. It will be called "Pillsbury." Defendant 
and appellant, Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., A Corpora-
tion, was and is .a processor and buyer of turkeys at 
X ephi, Juab County, Utah. It will be called ''Nephi.'~ 
Cross-complainants, intervenors and respondents, Lafe 
Morley and Callie Morley, his wife, hereinafter called 
''l\1orleys," are turkey growers of Millard County, Utah. 
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This is a suit brought by Pillsbury against Nephi. 
The theory of the suit was that Nephi had purchased 
from Morleys some turkeys and was obligated to pay 
those proceeds to Pillsbury under the terms of the chattel 
Inortgage. It sought an accounting from Nephi as to the 
proceeds and a judgment for any proceeds not turned 
over to Pillsbury. ~Iorleys intervened and claimed off-
sets, and alleged Pillsbury was not entitled to any more 
1noney. N" ephi contends it purchased s.aid turkeys on 
~lorleys representation for Pillsbury and themselves of 
the balance owing Pillsbury which it remitted. After it 
developed said representations \Yere false, Morleys under-
took and agreed to protect Nephi against the suit by Pills-
bury and took or sent X ephi to ~Iorleys' attorney, who 
assured X ephi that it would be protected, and in effect 
need not follow the matter. :Jiorleys' attorney filed an 
answer, confessing that X ephi held $2700.00 which be-
longed either to Pillsbury or to :Jlorley. In effect the 
an.swer stated that Kephi was a stake holder. Thereafter, 
Morleys' attorney signed a stipulation to the effect that 
the court could enter judgment against X ephi. X ephi did 
not enter into the stipulation and was not giYen any notice 
thereof, or that the other parties were in effect asking for 
entry of judgment .against it. Upon learning of the judg-
nlent against Nephi, it asked the trial court to Yacate said 
judg1nent. 'l1he trial court refused to Yacate said judg-
lnent. This is an appeal fr01n the judg1nent entered 
against Nephi, the refusal of the trial court to Yaeate 
the judg1nent, .and grant a trial. It is predicated upon the 
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theory that Nephi never authorized anyone to confess 
judgment against it, and it was never given notice or 
knew that Pillsbury and ~1:orley were in effect stipulating 
for judgment against it. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about January 20, 1953 Pillsbury and Morleys 
entered into a turkey raiser financing .agreement; and to 
secure performance thereof and payment to Pillsbury 
by Morleys of a sum not to exceed $60,500.00 on or before 
December 31, 1953, Morleys did on or about the 1st day of 
April, 1953 execute and deliver a chattel mortgage to the 
Pillsbury, a copy of which is attached to the Pillsbury's 
complaint (R. 2 to 3). 
Said mortgage w.as upon turkeys located on the farm 
of Morleys near Delta, Millard County, Utah. It was filed 
of record in Millard County, Utah; and there is no evi-
dence herein of filing it in any other county. Among 
other things it provided that in the event Morleys desired 
to sell they would notify Pillsbury, and if written con. 
sent were obtained: 
"*** such sale will be made (by Morleys) for 
the use and benefit of the mortgagee to the extent 
of whatever obligations the mortgagors may owe 
to the mortgagee, and further agree that the 
moneys received from such sale to the extent of 
such obligations shall be and belong to the mort-
gagee and be applied upon and by way of mort-
gagors' said obligations up to the full extent there-
of, and shall be remitted by the buyer of such tur-
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keys directly to the mortgagee or its agent there-
unto duly authorized without any right in mort-
gagors to receive any of the proceeds of such sale 
except such surplus as there may be over and 
above the amount of such obligations. Said mort-
gagors will direct the buyer to pay the proceeds of 
such sale to the mortgagee to the extent of the ob-
ligation.s owed by said mortgagors to the mort-
gagee.***." (R. 2-3, Ex. A. compt.). 
During 1953 Pillsbury sold ~Iorleys certain turkey 
feeds; and in connection therewith made certain represen-
tations and warranties of the character of said feed (R. 
7-11). 
On or about November -±, 1953, ~Iorleys with consent 
of Pillsbury sold their 1953 turkeys X ew York Dressed 
to Nephi (defendant) at Xephi, rtah (Tr. 12-13; Ex. 2, 
3, 4, 7, A). On or about the same day, Lafe ~Iorley told 
M. L. Harmon, President-:Jlanager of defendant, Morleys 
were indebted to Pillsbury in the sum of approximately 
$41,000.00-$43,722.08; that he had 5000 toms to process 
and market; that they would weigh approximately so 
much; that he needed $4,000.00 for Ray Nielsen (for 
labor) and he needed $3,000.00 for hilnself. ~-1 computa-
tion was 1nade of the esti1nated purchase price to be paid 
by Nephi for said turkeys upon the repre.sentation by 
Morleys and the 1nutual assu1nption of the average weight 
of said turkeys to be detennined in fact as the basis of 
the agreed purchase price. lTpon such esti1uate it ap-
peared there would be sufficient 1noney to pay Pillsbury 
Forty-three Thousand odd dollars ($43,722.08) and make 
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the $7,000.00 advance payment to and for J\lforleys as 
requested (Tr. 10-12, 30-31). 
Pursuant to the above computed price Nephi did on 
November 4, 1953 deliver to Ray Nielsen a check for 
$4,000.00, and to Lafe Morley a check for $3,000.00 as a 
part payrnent of the purchase price of said turkeys, sub-
ject to the later final determination of the correct total 
sale price of said turkeys, according to the actual weight 
after they \vere processed. After ;;aid purchase price was 
detennined upon the actual processed weight of the birds 
delivered and the .account between Nephi and Lafe Morley 
was cast up as of November 4, 1953 the account showed 
an advance overpayment on the agreed purchase price 
of $3,887.25 (Tr. 10, 30-31). 
Lafe Morley had also been a customer of Nephi 
during 1952. At the end of 1952 he was indebted to 
Nephi in the sum of $2,135.33 ( Tr. 10-11; Ex. 1). In 1953 
he was again .a customer of Nephi, and on November 
:.25, 1953, he was indebted to Nephi in the sum of $6,506.38 
plus $20.88, which by credit of $514.60 was reduced to 
$6,012.58 owing by Lafe :Morley to Nephi on February 
1, 1954 (Ex. 1); and that on February 24, 1954 Lafe 
:Morley signed a promissory note as of February 1, 1954 
to Nephi in said sum of $6,012.58 (Tr. 9-12, 31, Ex. 1, 
Ex. 2). 
During all of 1954 said Lafe Morley, Ray Nielsen 
and 11. L. Harmon were partners, dba M. & J. Co. 
(R. 31). 
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On January 14, 1954 Pillsbury's counsel by letter 
notified Nephi that :Morley's indebtednes.s to Pillsbury 
was $46,401.24 less $43,722.08 remitted by Nephi to Pills-
bury, leaving a balance owing of $2,679.16 and requested 
Nephi render Pillsbury a complete accounting (Ex. A, 
Tr. 37-8). 
On January 20, 1954: X ephi answereJ, which was in 
part as follows : 
"Nephi Processing Plant notified :Jir. Lee 
Turner of Pillsbury Co., Ogden, Utah also Pills-
bury Co.'s office at Los Angeles that they stand 
ready and willing to pay to Pillsbury Co. for the 
account of Lafe Morley $2,679.16 as soon as we 
receive the authority frmn Lafe Morley to do so. 
""\Ve do not feel that ·we should make a pay-
ment on the account of Lafe :Morley until we have 
the authority from l\Ir. Morley in writing. 
"It is n1y understanding that :Jir. :Jiorley is 
Inaking smne kind of a clain1 against the Pills-
bury Co. \V e do not 'vant to be involved in any 
controversy between these two parties but do have 
to clear ourselves in this 1natter. 
"The offer to clear this account will be termin-
ated thirty days frmn date and the matter will 
have to be worked out directlY with :Jir. Morlev." 
A copy of said letter 1cas.sent to Lafe 1JI01·ley 
(Ex. 7). 
By letter dated February 11, 195± Pillsbury\~ counsel 
. . 
wrote Nephi again requesting the accounting and pro-
ceeds under the tenns of the 1nortgage; and anwno- other 
b 
things stated: 
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"Any dispute that may exist between Pills-
bury and Mr. Morley need not be of any concern 
to you (Nephi Processing Company) as the same 
will be settled by the parties themselves directly, 
except as aid of the courts may be involved." 
and advised that legal proceeding would be brought 
against Nephi (Ex. B; Tr. 37). 
Shortly after receipt of Exhibit B from the Pillsbury's 
attorney, l\1. L. Harmon saw Lafe :Morley and had a con-
versation with hiin concerning the contents thereof, in 
the defendant's office at Nephi. Mr. Harmon told Mr. 
Morley that said letter had been received, and that it 
claimed Nephi was indebted to Pillsbury about $2,700.00. 
He also told J\1orley that he (Morley) was indebted to 
Nephi; but in view of the fact Harmon, Morley (and 
Nielsen) were going ahead with their turkey operation 
in 1954, Harmon would endeavor to h.ave Nephi advance 
enough money to pay Pillsbury the $2,700.00 if Morley so 
directed. Morley said he had a claim against Pillsbury 
much greater than $2,700.00 and it would be offset; and 
that Morrley would protect the defendant from liability 
herein (R. 31-2 Tr. 22-23). 
Pillsbury brought this action against Nephi without 
joining ~lorleys. On or .about :May 10, 1954 Nephi was 
served with process herein ( Tr. 23). It was left with 
M. L. Harmon. He forthwith contacted Lafe Morley and 
advised Morley of said service. Lafe Morley advised 
Nephi that Morley's attorney was Dwight L. King of 
Salt Lake City, Utah; that all Harmon needed to do 
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to protect Nephi herein was to go .and see said attorney 
of said Morleys (Tr. 24-5; R. 32-3). 
About :.May 15, 195-± Harmon took summons to at-
torney Dwight L. King. Harmon told Mr. King what 
Mr. Morley had told l\Ir. Harmon. Mr. King told Mr. 
Harmon there wa.s a greater sum owing :.Mr. :Jiorley 
(by Pillsbury) so that he (Harmon) would not have to 
be concerned about it; that he (King) would protect 
Nephi in this suit and in the suit .against Pillsbury. At 
that time Harmon told King that ~{orley was indebted 
to Nephi in the sum of $6,012.58 for 1953 and prior years 
operations. Harmon did not tell :Jir. King that X ephi had 
$2,700.00 on hand which could be remitted to Pillsbury 
(or any other sum). That was the only conversation 
I-Iarmon had with ~Ir. King. After what :l\Ir. King told 
him, 11r. Harmon didn't think Nephi would need to be 
represented, and relied upon :Jir. K~ing to file an answer 
on behalf of Nephi and the :Jlorleys (Tr. ~-1-6, 32-33). 
Unknown in fact to X ephi, I\::ing filed a Motion for 
Change of Yenue in the nan1e of Xephi (H. 3)~ but for 
Morleys (Ex. 9, Tr. -15 ). 
Eleven months passed by without any actiYity of 
record in the case. No conununication or word passed 
between Nephi and nlr. K_ing. 
May 1G, 1955 nlr. 1'-ing filed herein ~Iorley"s cross-
complaint against Pillsbury, alleging a breach of said 
turkey raising eontract and warranties, and prayed that 
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the court order $2,700.00 in the hands of Nephi be paid 
to l\!Iorleys, and I\lorleys have judgment against the plain-
tiff for $23,634.00 less any sum due and owing under the 
1nortg.age involved herein; and for such other and further 
relief as to the court may seem meet and equitable (R. 
7-11). It was not served on Nephi. Pillsbury's answer 
thereto was not served on defendant (R. 18-20). At the 
same time Mr. King filed 1\iorleys Motion to Intervene 
(R. 12). It was not served on Nephi; and no information 
of or notice of any or all of these matters came to Nephi 
until after entry of judgment, February 22, 1957 (Tr. 
G-8; 25-6). 
On .May 16, 1955 1\ir. l{ing filed .an answer in the 
name of Nephi, and purportedly for Nephi, and therein 
it was falsely stated that Nephi held in its hands approxi-
mately $2,700.00 from the sale price of J\1orleys 1953 
turkeys. Said answer prayed that the court determine 
to whom the funds in Nephi's hands belonged, and make 
such orders .as are necessary to protect Nephi against 
Pillsbury or J\tforleys for such payments should the court 
require the Nephi to pay either, and for such further re-
lief as to the court 1nay seern meet and equitable in th~ 
premises (R. 13-14). It was not a pleading to protect 
Nephi; but was in the nature of an interpleader to help 
Morleys. No authority was given by Nephi to file such 
a pleading. It was repudiated when it became known 
(R. 29-31). 
The Secretary-Treasurer of Nephi, Mr. Steele, never 
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knew prior to February 22, 1957 that Dwight L. King 
purported to represent Nephi in the above cause. He 
never saw a copy of the answer filed herein by Mr. King 
in the name of Nephi until after February 21, 1957, when 
a copy of said answer was brought to Kephi's office by 
attorney Jensen. 1\Ir. Steele was the one who always 
picked up Nephi's mail during 195-1 and 1955, and no 
communication was received from D\vight L. King during 
those years in relation to this case; and no .such record 
was in the files of :Kephi (Tr. 3-7). ~Ir. King claims he 
forwarded a copy of the answer filed in the name of 
X ephi under date of ~lay 13, 1955 (R. 42), which ·was 
never received by Nephi. 
On November 13, 1956 the above cause '''as set to 
be tried February 13, 1955 (R. 21). On January 23, 
1957, written interrogatories were sub1nitted to the :Jfor-
leys by Pillsbury and served upon ~Ir. King, as counsel 
for the 1\Iorleys. On January :29, 1957, Pillsbury noticed 
l\fr. King as :Morley's counsel, and purported!~~ as Xephi's 
counsel, he would take the deposition of Lafe :Morley 
(R. 24). No word was sent to or receiyed by Xephi of 
any of the~e. (X o exmnination of Lafe :Jlorley was made 
on behalf of Nephi). 
On I~..,ebruar:· 1:~. 1 !l:l I, ~r r. I~ing, as attorney for 
the .:\lorle:·~ ~igned a stipulation that judgn1ent 1night 
be entPred again~t ~ephi. It "·as filed February ~1, 
1 9!>7. l\fr. King· did not P\"Pll purport to sign as attorney 
for NPplt i (R. ~;) ). On February 18, 1957 judgnient was 
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rendered and entered on February 21, 1957 in favor of 
Pillsbury and against Nephi for $2,679.16 plus interest, 
or for $3,181.38 (R. 27). On the sa1ne date judgment 
w.as entered dismissing said cros.s-complaint on a written 
stipulation dated February 19, 1957 between counsel for 
Pillsbury and counsel for Morleys (R. 26). 
On February :21, 1957 counsel for Pillsbury wrote 
X ephi that judgment had been entered against it in thr. 
above amounts and asked Nephi to pay same (Ex. 5, Tr. 
27). 
On February :22, 1957 Udell R. Jensen, counsel for 
Nephi, called attorney King by phone. At that time :Mr. 
King stated he didn't represent Nephi herein and that 
the pleading he filed in Nephi's name was only as a 
matter of courtesy or accommodation (Tr. 45-6; R. 52-3). 
On February 25, 1957 at 7:30 p.m. (after judgment 
had been entered) an envelope was mailed to Mr. Milton 
Harmon, Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., Nephi, Utah, by 
Dwight L. King. It contained .a letter which was dated 
February 13, 1957 to "Dear Milton"; and stated that the 
Pillsbury and Morleys had finally agreed, and the bal-
ance held from the sale of the Morley birds in 1953 could 
be paid to the plaintiff (Ex. 6; Tr. 26-7). 
The first information which came to Nephi after 
Pillsbury's letters requesting .an accounting and payment 
dated January 14, 1954 and February 11,1954 (Ex. A and 
B) was Exhibit 5 dated February 21, 1957, after entry 
of judgrnent (Tr. 25-7). 
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On ~larch 12, 1957 counsel for defendant wrote Mr. 
King, in part as follows : 
"In view of your statement to me over the 
phone on February 22, 1957, that you did not 
represent the Nephi Processing Plant in the above 
c.ase, will you please advise me on behalf of the 
Nephi Processing Plant the following: 
1. On whose state1nent, and on what facts did 
you file the ~lotion for Change of Venue in 
the above case, and also the Answer, both 
of which purport to be filed on behalf of the 
Nephi Processing Plant. 
2. If you at the ti1ne believed you represented 
the Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., a corpora-
tion, when did you first cmne to the view 
that you no longer represented them in the 
above case~ 
3. \Vhat noti('e or infonnation did you give to 
the Nephi Processing Plant, or any of its 
officers, that you did not represent said Pro-
cessing Plant in said case f 
.f. \:Vhat, if an:~, notice did you giYe to them, Or 
anyone on their behalf, that you intended to 
have the Judgment entered against them 
dated February 1~. 1957." (Ex. 8, Tr. 45). 
On :L\larch 15, 1!);)7, he an~wered in part as follows: 
"* * * I never did discu~s the :Jiotion for 
Change of Venue with an:~one representing X ephi 
Proeessing Plant to In:~ recollection, that was 
purely the di~eu~~ion between n1~~self and l\Ir. 
Morley. 
''2. In an::-;\H'r to question nu1nber two the 
' 
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question of representing Nephi Processing Plant, 
Inc. other than for the purpose of protecting 
:Morley's interest was never discussed with any-
one. When .Mr. Harmon came into my office to 
discuss this matter he had already talked to :Mor-
ley and 1Iorley had instructed him to come in 
and had told hi1n that I was representing the 
l\lorleys in their claim against Pillsbur)· l\1:ills. 
The Answer which was filed represented my 
understanding of the only interest which Nephi 
Processing Plant Inc. had in the law suit, namely, 
that of a stake holder .and were only concerned 
about not having to pay twice on the same claim. 
"3. I mn sure .Jlr. Harmon will recall that 
no fee -was ever discussed with 1ne nor has there 
ever been any tendered or received by 1ne for 
the Answer which was filed disclaiming any inter-
est in the money on the p,art of Nephi Processing 
Plant, Inc. 
".No notice was ever given to Nephi Proces-
sing Plant of my not representing said plant. I 
never did represent them so it was not my thought 
in the matter that I was not representing them." 
(Ex. 9; Tr. 45). 
A further letter was sent by attorney Jensen for the 
defendant to attorney King on March 19, 1957 (Ex. 10; 
Tr. -±5 ). March 27, 1957, attorney l(ing answered at 
length stating his position and explaining his conduct. 
11herein, among other things, he says : 
"~fy only interest was in presenting for 1vfor-
leys a claim against Pillsbury Mills, Inc., which 
I have done and which I have settled satisfactory 
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to my client, Lafe ~forley, and to my own satis-
faction." (Ex. 11; Tr. 45). 
On April 15, 1957 Nephi filed its ~lotion to Vacate 
Judgment rendered February 18, 1957 challenging at-
torney King's authority to appear or plead for defend-
ant herein; to strike the answer filed by him in defend-
ant's name; and to pennit defendant to file its tendered 
answer (actually filed 4-15-57, R. 46-48) to which was 
attached the affidavits of ~I. L. Harmon and Edward 
W. Clyde (R. 31-7). Said affidavit of ~Ir. Clyde state'S 
he advised ::\[r. King that ~Ir. Clyde was not the attorney 
for the defendant in the above cause or generally; that 
notice should be given to either ::\Ir. John S. Boyden 
or Udell R. Jen.sen (R. 33-6). Xo such notice was given, 
or clai1ned to be given, by ::\Ir. King. 
The accounting case between Lafe ~Iorley, Ray 
Nielsen and :i\1. L. Hannon filed in Juab County, rtah 
(Civil No. 3767) is referred to by ::\Ir. King (Ex. 9, R . 
.J.l-45), in which ~Ir. Arthur Xielsen is counsel for ::\Iorley 
and Nielson. In that case, ::\f r. Nielson has resisted the 
inclusion therein of the further and supplemental answer 
and defense of the facts of the judgn1ents entered in this 
case. On pre-trial of that case in Juab County, which 
l\1 r. l~ing refers to in his affidavit, the Hon. ::\Iaurice 
Harding announced he was inclined to rule that the 
1natters which could han' been litigated in this c.ase 
(Civil No. 29182) could not be included in Civil No. 
3767 (R. 51-53). 
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On April 19, 1957 deinand was made on Dwight L. 
1\:ing for the production of certain documents, at th8 
time the motion to vacate the judgment was to be heard 
(R. 37-8). Said docuinents were never produced; and 
Dwight L. King never appeared in court on this matter. 
His only stateinent in the case is his affidavit filed 
herein after the hearing. 
On June 13, 1957 the district court entered its order· 
denying defendant's Inotion to vacate the judgment and 
to strike pleading filed by :Mr. King in defendant's name 
and to pennit filing of defendant's answer (R. 54). 
On June :28, 1957 defendant filed its motion for re-
hearing or new trial, and attached an affidvait referring 
to the documents or papers which the .Morleys and their 
counsel had been asked to produce, asserting that Dwight 
L. King advised defendant on April 20, 1957 that he 
claimed to have written a letter to defendant, which 
among other things read: "I do not think that it will be 
necessary for you to appeal (appear) or take any action 
at the time of trial." Therein is asserted lack of notice, 
surprise and excuse for failure to produce documents 
which would have established that the Morley defendants 
knew that the substance of the answer of the defendant 
was false; that the defendant and the court had been 
imposed on; and that by ordinary diligence defendant 
could not produce said documents at the hearing on the 
motion herein (R. 84-5). 
Defendant's motion for rehearing or new trial wa:::; 
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denied by the trial court the 21st day of August, 1957 
(R. 88). 
Notice of appeal frorn denial of the Motion to Vacate 
the Judgment, strike the pleading filed by attorney King 
in defendant's narne, and to permit defendant to file its 
answer herein was filed July 15, 1957 (R. 102). 
Second Notice of Appeal from the ruling of the 
court denying defendant's motion for rehearing or new 
trial was filed September 10, 1957 (R. 111). 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The real dispute arose between Pillsbury and the 
~Iorleys as to whether 1\Iorleys owed Pillsbury or Pills-
bury owed l\Iorleys on their transaction. Without any 
notice to or information received by X ephi, Pillsbury 
and 1\Iorleys settled their differences between thmnselvea; 
and they then stipulated \\ithout notice to Nephi judg-
rnent be entered in favor of Pillsbury and against Xephi 
for the debt of :.Morleys. 
The terms of the rnortgage betw·een Pillsbury and 
:Morleys arnong other things provided that the rnort-
gagors (l\lorleys) would direct the buyer (Nephi) to 
pa~r the proceeds of the sale to rnortgagee (Pillsbury) 
to the extent of the obligation owed by said l\forleys to 
Pillsbury. For thP purpose of giving that infonnation, 
it appears Pillsbury had de.signated l\Iorleys .as its agent 
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to advise Nephi as to what the mortgage debt was. Like-
wi'se it appears that l\1 orleys were selling as an agent 
of Pillsbury. In both connections the representations of 
the Morleys to the buyer bound Pillsbury. 
The record.s of Nephi, the testimony of its president-
manager and its secretary-treasurer all establish beyond 
any question that the representations of the mortgagors 
(~Iorley~) to K ephi as buyer were false. It was by inad-
vertance, or by intentional1nisrepresentation of :Morleys 
and mistake or inadvertance, of Nephi that the figures 
were relied on .and the 1noney paid to and for Morleys. 
Pillsbury did not notify Nephi of the amount it claimed 
until the second 1nonth after the sale of the turkeyc. 
Under such circumstances, Pillsbury is not entitled to 
recover from the purchaser, 10 Am. Jur., Sec. 192 p. 843. 
Pillsbury may not pass its loss, if any, to Nephi, which 
arose under and through Morleys while acting as an 
agent of Pillsbury, 10 Am. J ur., Sec. 203 p. 850. 
POINT I. 
THIS IS AN ACTION TO RECOVER A DEBT OR FOR 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF A RIGHT SECURED BY A MORT-
GAGE. THE LAW REQUIRES THE DEBTS BE DETER-
MINED THEREON AND OFFSETS ALLOWED; AND THE 
JUDGMENT OR ORDER SHOULD BE VA.CATED AS THIS 
WAS NOT DONE. 
It is asserted by Pillsbury; and also asserted in the 
affidavit of Dwight L. King that the settlement between 
Pillsbury and Morleys had nothing to do with Nephi 
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herein. Said position is not sustained by either the facto, 
the pleadings, or the law. 
Pillsbury attached to its cmnplaint a copy of the 
chattel mortgage. It alleged it was filed in l\Ellard 
County, Utah; that it is in full force and effect; that 
the debt secured thereby is in an amount in excess of 
$2700.00; and i.s now owing from Morleys (mortgagors) 
to Pillsbury, and it is past due. Under ''Second" said 
nwrtgage reads: 
"This n1ortgage is given to secure the indebt-
edness of the mortgagors to the mortgagee created 
and to be created under and by virtue of the terms 
of one certain Turkey Raiser's Financing Agree-
ment between the parties hereto dated January 
20, 1953, and to secure the faithful performance 
by the mortgagors of the terms of said agree-
ment * * *." 
The prayer of the con1plaint then asked that Nephi 
be required to account; and upon said accounting, Nephi 
be ordered to pay over .and deliver Pillsbury all proceeds 
from the sale of said turkeys not theretofore delivered 
to Pillsbur~,, and upon it8 failure so to do Pillsbury have 
and recover judg1nent against X ephi for the amount 
thereof, and for such other and further relief as 1nay be 
proper. 
l\forley~ in paragraph IY of their cross-cmnplaint, in 
part ple.ad a~ follows: 
•'Thn t as part of the agree1nent between the 
plaintiff and these cross cmnplainants, cross con1· 
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plainants agree to purchase from the plaintiff 
whole grain pellets and other necessary feeds for 
the turkey poults. That all of the moneys advanced 
by the plaintiff under the mortgage were used 
by cross complainants for the purchase of feed 
for turkeys, for the care and raising of said 
turkey poults. " 
Part of paragraph X of said cros.s-complaint read::;: 
"That there remains due and owing on said 
mortgage a sun1 Inuch less than the amount due 
to these cross-complainants from the plaintiff as 
a result of the breach, of implied and expressed 
warranties of the plaintiff's whole grain pellets." 
In part the prayer thereof reads: 
"these cross c01nplainants have judgment 
against the plaintiff for the sum of $23,634.00, less 
any sum due and owing under that certain mort-
gage of ani1nate chattels dated the 1st day of 
April, 1953." 
Other .allegations of cross-complaint were that Pillsbury 
breached the warranties that ordinarily go with the sal8 
of feeds; and as heretofore pointed out, then asked that 
the cross-complainants have judgment against Pillsbury 
less any sum due and owing under said 1nortgage. What 
could be plainer in a pleading as a request for an offset, 
without calling it such, than the words of the cross-
complaint. There is no doubt that hy Morleys request 
for relief, they tied the feeding contract and the mortgage 
together, and that .all they did thereafter did not change 
the legal effect of these proceedings as they relate to 
Nephi. 
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This case is an action brought by a mortgagee under 
the terms of its mortgage. It appears our statute on 
actions brought on mortgages governs this action. 
'There can be but one action for the recovery 
of .any debt or the enforcement of any right se-
cured by mortgage upon* * *personal property, 
which action must be in accordance with the pro-
visions of this chapter. Judgment shall be given 
adjuding the mnount due with costs and disburse-
ments * * * ." 
78-37-1 U. C. A. '53. 
A situation not too unlike this one arose in a l-:-tah 
case hereinafter referred to, except said action was 
brought to foreclose .a 1nortgage, instead of recover the 
proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged assets. Said 
1nortgage was given to secure pay1nent for the construc-
tion of a building upon the property of the defendant. 
The plaintiff's as.signor (an uncle of plaintiff) agreed 
to build a house in a certain 1nanner; but did not perform 
it in accordance with its tenus. The court in that case 
held the dmnages arising under the building contract 
were offset against the indebtedness under the 1nortgage, 
even with the uwrtgage in the hands of an assignee. 
Stevens v. Do:1~·cy, 58 F. 196; 198 P. :216. 
Another lTtah ease of siu1ilar effect is one in which 
the IJlaintiff sought to foreclose a 1nort()'a()'e but did 
b b' 
not ask for .any deficjenr~' judg1uent. In that case, it 
was urged that then' could not be any offset bec.ause 
there had been no request for a deficienc~T judg1nent. 
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In that case, the court said: 
"The request or absence of request for a 
deficiency judgment does not determine whether 
or not a defendant may urge any defense which 
he otherwise nlight have. Foreclosure is statutory. 
Foreclosure proceedings on a mortgage securing 
a note in default rnust be conducted in accordance 
with the statutes, Sec. 104-55-1 to 9, U. C. A. 1943. 
It is necessary to have the court ascertain what 
sum of rnoney, if any, is due and owing on the 
note and mortgage * * *. If it is detennined that 
the mortgage has received funds sufficient to 
extinguish the mortgage indebtedness, and which 
funds should have been so applied, the mortgagor 
has a right to have such funds applied to the 
payment of the rnortgage note as of the date when 
they should have been so applied." 
Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler et al, 105 U. 
529 at p. 540-1; (144 P. 2d 276). 
On Point I, we submit that this is .an action to enforce 
a right secured by a mortgage, and the law requires that 
the debt owing fron1 Morleys (mortgagors) to Pillsbury 
be determined and offset allowed thereon. As this was 
not done the judgment should be vacated and the trial 
court directed to proceed to adjudicate the amounts 
owing between the mortgagor .and mortgagee. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL; 
OR IF REPRESENTED, ITS COUNSEL HAD NO AUTHOR-
ITY TO PLEAD AS HE DID; AND DEFENDANT WAS 
ABANDONED BY COUNSEL WITHOUT NOTICE OR 
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KNOWLEDGE. JUDGMENT RENDERED AGAINST DE-
FENDANT WITHOUT NOTICE OR KNOWLEDGE IS WITH-
OUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND IS TO BE VACATED. 
The evidence is clear and uncontradicted that no 
notice, letter or word was received from l\Ir. King, or 
other persons, by Nephi, its officers or agents of either 
or any of the following: (a) that ~Ir. King had filed 
a l\Iotion to Change the Yenue, (b) that he had filed 
an Answer in the nmne of the defendant, or (c) that he 
had in Nephi's nmne pleaded Xephi held $2700.00 of 
proceeds from the sale of l\Iorleys' 1953 turkeys. So 
there was and cannot be any en1ployment by ratification, 
or estoppel by knowledge and failure to act. 
It is said there Inust be a contract of emplo-y1nent, 
express or in1plied, between the attorney and the party 
for wh01n he purports to act or some one authorized 
to represent such party, 5 Aln. J ur. 278. 
Our Supreine Court in .a case involving similar 
questions quoted with approval an earlier case in part 
as follows: 
"Their appearance is pri1na facie evidence of 
authority to act, but when such authority is de-
nied, or properly put in issue. it is con1petent to 
rebut by proofs any presun1ptions which Inay 
arise fr01n such acts. If the .attornev was without 
authority, then his acts could bind ~no one * * *. 
It follo\~s, a8 a logical r~snlt of the propositions 
before d1scussed, that a Jndginent rendered with-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
out service, or upon the unauthorized appearance 
of an attorney is ( * * *) void." 
Blyth & Fargo Co. v. Swenson, 15 U. 345 at 
354-5, 49 P. 1027. 
Further it is held in said case that the judgment will 
not stand, and the parties will not be left to their remedy 
against the attorney. Same effect: Lowe v. Bank of 
Vernal, 110 l~. 496; 175 P. 2d JS-!. Judgment in said case 
was vacated by district court. 
If in May, 1954 Dwight L. King was the attorney 
for Nephi herein, he had the following duties: to faith-
fully, honestly and consistently represent the interests, 
and protect the rights of his clients; and to discharge 
tho.se duties with the strictest fidelity and the utmost 
good faith. 5 Am. J ur., Sec. 46, p. 286. 
Our standards of representation of a client state: 
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting 
interests except by express consent of all con-
cerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. 
Within the meaning of this cannon, a lawyer rep-
rents conflicting interests, when in behalf of one 
client, it is his duty to contend for that which 
duty to another client requires him to oppose." 
Rule 6 of Professional Conduct of Utah State 
Bar. 
The answer filed in May, 1955 by .Mr. King in 
Nephi's name was without authority, or in excess of 
authority and purported to contain an .admission which 
tended to create liability against Nephi. No written or 
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oral authority appears on the record on which that type 
of pleading was filed. 
Even where there is no conflict of interest, counsel 
has no implied authority to make admission of liability 
against his client. Such authority must be expressly 
granted. 
In an action involving an admission by counsel for 
appellant that the appellant was "liable" for the reason-
able rental value of the lands, our rtah court held that 
such an admis.sion was but a legal conclusion and was 
not binding either upon the person upon whose behalf 
it was purportedly made (appellant) nor upon the court. 
Re: Iiansen's Estate, 53 U. 23, 184 P. 197, Syl. 3. 
In relation to authority to confess a judgment against 
his client, the following appears: 
"At con1mon law a judgn1ent was confessed 
pursuant either to a warrant of attorney or a 
cognovit actione1n. And more recently the practice 
is regulated by statutes, in s01ne states based upon 
this c01nmon-law practice. The 1nanner in which 
the authorit~· to confess judgn1ent is created, 
whether at connnon law or under statute would 
seem to negative any i1nplied authority on the 
part of the attorney 1nerel~· fr01n the relation 
of attorney and client." 
B. C. Pr. and R., r ol. 1, Sec. 57. p. 66 
While there is authorjty that a counsel for a party 
has authority to confes.s judg1nent, it is limited. The fol-
lowing illustrates the limitation: 
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"Moreover, a considerable number of deci-
sions maintain the view that an attorney h.as no 
implied authority to enter a consent decree or 
confess judgment without the client's direction, 
knowledge, or consent, and that where a judgment 
or decree is entered against the prote.st of the 
client or his instructions not to compromise, it 
will be held not binding on the client, especially 
when the judgment or decree is designated to 
carry into effect an unauthorized compromise." 
5Am. Jur. Sec. 101, p. 322-Attorneys at Law 
The judg1nent .appears to be one entered upon an 
unauthorized stipulation for confession of judgment, or 
one on 1notion for summary judgment. Judgment by 
confes.sion is authorized by 78-22-3 U.C.A. '53. Rul8 
58A (e) provides "the party seeking the same must file 
with the clerk * * * a statement verified by the defend-
ant * * * concisely stating the claim and that the sum 
confessed therefor is justly due or to become due;" and 
authorize the entry of judgment for a specified sum. 
No verified statement was filed; and no specified sum 
w.as pleaded. 
Rule 56 (c) provides that a motion for summary 
judgment shall be served at least 10 days before the 
time fixed for the hearing. No such motion was served. 
Surely the filing of an unverified answer in the 
name of Nephi "that it now holds the sum of approxi-
mately $2700.00 which is a portion of the proceeds from 
the .sale of turkeys delivered to it by Lafe ~lorley and 
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Callie Morley'' is, to say the least, a careless and flag-
rant disregards of the facts and duties of counsel for 
Nephi, if he were such. It is not only an abandonment of 
Nephi and its interests; but was an aider of his Morley 
clients interests. To contend Nephi held money for either 
the Morleys or Pillsbury was to the interest of the 
Morleys for interpleader or intervention, or both. It 
was against the interests of Nephi. 
It was then the duty of l\Ir. King to take steps to 
terminate the apparent relationship which existed on 
the record, to make a full disclosure of the record to 
Nephi; and to inform Nephi that it should obtain inde-
pendent legal advice. But on the contrary King says 
he wrote a letter in ~Iay, 1955 to Nephi, which was never 
received, and the copy of which was never produced by 
Mr. King; but he advised of its contents, part of which 
were: 
"I do not think that it will be necessary for 
you to .appeal (appear) or take any action at the 
time of the trial." (R. 84-5). 
The same or similar language was used by another 
counsel who wrote his client and prepared an answer 
for a defendant where there was conflicting interests, 
believing he was doing right. But the court held defend-
ant was deprived of a fair trial essential to due process 
and defendant was entitled to a new trial. Hammett v. 
Mcintyre, 249 P. 2d 885, Cal. 
J n part l\[r. l{ing atte~npts to clailn notice was given 
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Xephi in Fe!Jnuu~·, 1U;)7 just before judgment, by calling 
attorne~· l~d Clyde and .advising him of the proposed 
settlement. The affidavit of .Mr. Clyde shows that the 
information given to him was not given h~· him to Nephi 
and also that he was not the attorney for Nephi in thi3 
case or generally, and that he so advised .Mr. King. 
"The relationship in a particular case cannot 
be established h~· the fad that it exists in some 
other case or has existed at some remote time, 
even though the subject matter of the two cases 
bears some relation to the other. 
;)Am . .Jwr. Sec. 29, z). 279. 
"In our opinion, it would be a dangerous pre-
cedent to hold that the relationship of attorney 
and client in a particular case can be established 
by the fact that such relationship exists in some 
other ('a~e, even though the subject matter of the 
two cases ma~· bear .smne apparent relation to 
each other * * *." 
Sandall t:. Sandall, 57 {'. 150 at p. 161193 P. 
1093. . 
On Point II defendant submits the judgment and 
order were entered without representation hy counsel; 
or after abandonment by counsel, and without authority 
notice or information to N ephj, and should be vacated. 
POINT III. 
CONFLICTING INTERESTS OF DEFENDANT AND 
CROSS-COMPLAINANTS MAKE THE PLEADING FILED 
HEREIN IN THE NAME OF DEFENDANT IN 195'4 AND 
THE ONE FILED IN 1955 OF NO EFFE.CT. 
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The conflicting interests of l\1orleys and Nephi 1nake 
the answer filed by Dwight L. King in 1955 in Nephi's 
name a filing without any authority of Nephi, of no force 
and effect, and void .as pleading of Nephi. 
The law upon this question of the effect of such 
conflict of intere.sts is quite clear. In a matter in Califonia 
involving an incompetent and a guardianship, the court 
said: 
"An attorney has a constant and perpetual 
rendezvous with ethics. He stands as a trustee 
for his clients interests-a most sacred and con-
fidential relationship. It is elementary that a con-
flict of interests between a trustee and his bene-
ficiary is never permiss.able. As a trustee cannot 
maintain an attitude adverse to his beneficiary, 
so an attorney may not represent claims incon-
sistent with those of his clients, or conflicting 
claims of two clients. He cannot serve two 
masters." 
McClure v. Dononw, 186 P. 2d 718. 
Our Utah Law is not without good examples of 
what this type of conflicting interests does in relation 
to the rights of clients. One of the early cases that ap-
peared before our court was one in which an attorney 
held a pr01nissory note for one client; and thereafter 
for another client he had obtained judg1nent against the 
same persons for wh01n he held the note: and thereafter 
through legal proceedings eansed the note to be levied 
upon and sold. Thus conflirt arose as to the o\vnership 
of the not<' and the certifieates of stock that may have 
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pa~~ed under the uwrtgage or a deed. ln that case our 
court struck down the proceedings under which the note 
wa~ levied on, .and among other things said, therein re-
ferring to an earlier case in Utah and quoting it: 
"It is a well settled general rule that an at-
torney cannot represent conflicting interests. For 
uwre cogent reasons an attorney 1nay not, hy a 
contract of e1nployment with his client, place him-
self in a position where his own interests are in 
conflict with those of his client. rrhe relation of 
attorney and eli en t is one of trust and confidence 
requiring the attorney to use all the care, skill, 
and diligence at his command to serve his client 
alone without any obligation to serve a master 
whose interests 1na~, be adverse to those of his 
client, and without any temptation to serve his 
own interests at the expense of the interests of 
his client. The rule that an attorney may not by 
his contract of employ1nent place himself in a 
position where his own intere.sts or the interests 
of another, whmn he represents, conflicts with the 
interests of his dient, is founded upon principles 
of public policy * * * 
''In cases where applicable the rule has been 
rigidly adhered to by the courts * * *" 
Malia State Hank Com'r, et al v. Giles et al, 
100 l T. 3fi~, at p. 571; 11-t P. 2d 208. 
The above quotation is from Oillette v. Neu·. 
house Realty Com JHlny, 7:-J F. 13, 282 P. 
776, 779. 
In Gillette vs. N eu-Jw1tse Really ComJmny ,<,'?t]Jra, ou1 
court struck down the claim of a lawy<'r to recover for 
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his services in which the only conflicting interest wa~ 
that he was to recover as his fee 10o/o from one client 
which said client as a joint defendant might have the 
other joint defendant pay in satisfaction of claims against 
them both. In other words, counsel represented the hotel 
company sued jointly with an elevator company for 
damages resulting from the fall of an elevator. He was 
to get as his fee 10o/o of the amount which the elevator 
company would have to pay on this judgment. 
In our case, it would be a travesty on justice to 
permit counsel who purportedly appears for Nephi to 
say that Nephi had money in its hands, which all the 
evidence shows to be untrue ; and then for another party, 
Morleys, who actually owed Nephi, to obtain money from 
Pillsbury which should have paid l\Iorleys' debt; and 
assist Pillsbury to get judgment against Nephi who 
never did have an opportunity to appear and defend. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO VACATE THE 
JUDGMENT IN THAT IT IS EQUITABLE AND FAIR THAT 
DEFENDANT BE GIVEN NOTICE; THAT IT BE REPRE-
SENTED BY COUNSEL; AND THAT IT HAVE ITS DAY IN 
COURT, WHERE IT HAS A l\IERITORIOUS DEFENSE. 
The record in this ease shows that the motion of 
l\Iorleys to intervene was not served upon Nephi (R. 12). 
It shows the cross-cmnplaint of l\lorleys was not served 
upon Nephi (R. 11). Pillsbury's answer to the cross-
complaint wa~ not served on Nephi (R. 20). No notice 
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wa~ given to X ephi of the trial setting of the above 
c.ause (R. 21). No notic·e was given defendant of the 
continuance of the trial of February 13, 1957, if any 
occurred. The stipulation of attorney King purports to 
stipulate judgment again~t K ephi without its knowledge 
or approval. It was not served upon Nephi (R. :25). The 
stipulation for dismissal entered into hy Pillsbury's and 
.:\[orleys' counsel was not served upon X ephi (R. 26). 
All pleadings and actions by the court mentioned in 
this p.aragraph affected X ephi, and substantially con-
tributed to the court entering judgment against Nephi. 
"Rule No. 5 (a) of Civil Procedure in part 
provides "''' * * every pleading susequent to the 
original con1plaint * * * every written rnotion 
other than one which rnay be heard ex parte and 
every written notice, appearance, demand, offer 
of judgment * * * and other paper requiring 
service shall be served upon e.ach of the parties 
affected thereby * * * ." 
Of the above rule, it is said: 
"Rule 5 is simple, clear and effective. It re-
quires notice to every party affected, of every step 
in the acbon. The notice rrmst be given by the 
service of the ple.adings, notices and papers in 
the rnanner provided h~, subdivision (b) and (c)." 
Fed. Pra. and Pro. Rules Ed. Y ol. 1, Sec. 202, 
p. 357, Barron & Haltzoff. 
"A judgment is irregular where its rendition 
is contrary to the course and practice of the 
courts-that i~, whPre proper rules of practice 
have not been followed or where some nec·e~:-;ar~' 
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act has been omitted or has been done in an 
improper manner. There .are even cases in which 
a departure from the established modes of pro-
cedure have been held to render the judgment 
void." 
31.Am. Jur. Judg. Sec. 402, p. 67. 
'rhe failure of Pillsbury and Morleys to follow the 
established Civil Rules of Procedure were a substantial 
part of the causes of Nephi not having its day in court. 
"Notice and opportunity to be heard are es-
sentials to validity of judgment, without which 
judgment is denial of due process, and not en-
titled to respect of other courts." 
Morley et al. v. Morley et al. (Wash.) 1924, 
230 P. 645. 
By lack of notice, lack of representation by counsel 
and receipt of no information, Nephi did not have its 
day in court. 
"It is a fundamental doctrine of the law that 
a party to be affected by a personal judgment 
must have a day in court, or an opportunity to 
be heard.'' 
31.Am. Jur. Sec. 411, p. 7 -!. 
The tendered .answer of Nephi sets out 1neritorious 
defenses. Nephi's 1neritorious defenses are: 
1. The uwrtgage debt n1ust be determined 
.against the n1ortgagors, before Nephi can be 
liable thereon. 
2. Nephi is not indebted to Pillsburv. It did not 
have on hand anY nwnevs fr01n ;ale of mort-
gaged turkeys. It paid the full sale price and 
more. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
3. X ephi was entitled to purchase the turkeys 
from :Jlorley~ as agents of Pi!Jsbury; and to 
rely upon their representations as to amount 
OWing. 
+. Settlernent between Pillsbury and the 1\Ior-
leys discharged the n1ortgage as to Nephi. 
In support of the discharge of the debt ("-l:" above) 
we find the following: 
"The general rule is that where mutual debts 
between two persons are reciprocally extinguished 
by agreement, a mortgage securing one of them 
falls with the extinguished of the debt secured." 
36 Am. Jttr. Mortgages, Sec. +~S, p. 902. 
In the few instances of suits to enforce chattel rnort-
gages the view has been taken the facts and circumstances 
asserted were rneritorious defenses, and justified the 
vacating of th judgment. 17 ± ALR 163. 
On Point Y, we submit that the personal judgment 
against Nephi dated February 18, 1957 and entered 
February :.n, 19;)7; and the Order of Dismissal of the 
cross-complaint as jt affects Nephi adversely, by letting 
said _Morley~ out of this action, in equity should both be 
vacated and set aside; and the tendered answer of the 
defendant be permitted to be filed and the cause set 
down for trial. 
POINT V. 
RELIEF SHOULD BE GRANTED FROM JUDGMENT EN-
TERED UPON, INADVERTENCE, SURPRISE, OR EXCUS-
ABLE NEGLECT; OR OTHER JUST REASON; AND IT WAS 
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AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT NOT 
TO VACATE ITS JUDGMENT AND ORDER UNDER FACTS 
HEREIN. 
Our Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (b) in part 
provides: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice, relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceedings, for the following 
reasons: 
( 1) * * *, inadvertance, sup rise or excuseable 
neglect; 
(2) * * * 
( 3) fraud whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) * * * 
( 5) the judgment is void; or 
(6) * • * 
(7) any other reason justfiying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The rnotion shall 
be made within a reasonable time and for 
reasons (1) or (3), not n1ore than three 
months after the judgn1ent, order, or pro-
ceeding was entered or taken." 
In November, 1953 Nephi relied upon the misrepre-
sentation of l\1orleys that they only owed Pillsbury ap-
proxirnately $43,000.00 and were entitled as surplus over 
the rnortgage debt to $7,000.00 on the estimated pounds 
of turkeys sold to defendant, whirh defendant paid to 
and for the1n. Late in N oven1ber 1953 Lafe ::1\forley was 
infonned of overpay1nent by Nephi to ~Iorleys. In Febru-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
ary, 195-1 Lafe .l\Iorley recognized the overpayment had 
been Inade \vhen he signed a note to Nephi promising to 
p.ay it $6,012.58. 
For over twenty months following .JI ay, 1955 .Morleys 
by pleadings in the above action filed by their attorney 
Dwight L. K.ing, misrepresented that X ephi had on hand 
approximately $:2700.00 of receipts frmn sale of l\Iorleys 
1953 turkeys. 
It was a surprise to X ephi's officers to learn near 
the end of February, 19;)7 that in .May, 1954 a motion 
to change the venue of the cause had been filed in Nephi's 
nmne; and that a year later an answer had been filed 
in its nam.e stating it held approximately $:2700.00, which 
was false. It was a surprise to Nephi to find on or after 
February 22, 1957 that judginent had been entered in 
favor of Pillsbury and against K ephi. For three years 
last past it had relied upon the assurance of 1\Iorleys and 
for over thirty-one Inonths upon attorney King, that it 
would be protected frmn the clai1n of Pillsbury against 
X ephi, and Pillsbury's daim would be offset on .Morley's 
bill .against Pills bury herein. 
Surely it is excuseable for the manager-president 
of Nephi to be lulled into a false sense of security, when 
for over 31 months after l\lay, 1954, he had no word 
and no information that the above action was proceeding 
against Nephi; and during said time never le.arned Pill~­
bury and Morleys were contemplating having judgment 
entered herein against Nephi, and to make their own 
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settlmnent between them and not recognize an offset. 
(By the stipulated settlement Morleys obtained more 
money from Pillsbury than the judgment of Pillsbury 
against Nephi). 
This court has granted relief from failure of our 
trial courts to vacate default judgments and other judg-
ments within the provisions of U.R.C.P. 60 (b). In 
Commercial Bank Trumbo, 17 U. 198, 53 P. 1033; Cutler 
v. Haycock, 32 U. 354, 90 P. 897; and Cannon v. Tuft, 
3. U. 2d 410; 285 P.2d 843 it did so. None were more 
meritorious than this case on appeal. 
In a Utah case in which the lower court was su:-.;-
tained, this court recently .approved the following rule 
as the basis of relief from such judgment: 
"We are entirely in accord with the authori-
ties cited by plaintiff to the effect that it is gen-
erally regarded an abuse of discretion for a trial 
court to refuse to vacate a default judgn1ent where 
timely application is made and there is any reason-
able grounds for doing so to the end that cases 
may be decided on their 1nerits." 
Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 U. 2d 415; 303 P.2d 
995. 
In Utah Commercial Bank v. T'l·u1nbo, supra, our 
Supreme Court held that where the defendant "·as served 
and he had his wife submit the cause to a certain firm of 
attorneys; and then he left the state on business relying 
they would care for his case: and their letters to him 
and their notice of withdrawal fr01n his cause did not 
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reach hiru; it wa~ an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court not to vacate the judgment, when he made timely 
.application. 
In Cutler v. llaycock) supra, the Supreme Court 
holds that the mere fact the appellate court thinks the 
lower court should have granted the motion is not the 
test in all cases for reversing the judgment, but it raises 
a seriou.s doubt, and in such case a reasonable doubt i.;;; 
.always resolved in favor of granting a trial upon the 
merits. 
\Ve submit laymen are entitled to rely upon their 
partners representations and upon a partners counSl'l 
where no notice, fact or inforrnation cornes to their atten-
tion that such reliance is not well placed; and accordingly 
it was an abu.se of discretion for the trial judge not to 
vacate the judgment and give ~ eph i an opportunity to be 
heard on the merits. 
POINT VI. 
JUDGMENT SHOULD BE VACATED BECAUSE OF 
PROCEEDING CONTRARY TO U.R.C.P., FOR LACK OF 
TRIAL; FAILURE TO ENTER FINDINGS; AND FAILURE 
TO DISPOSE OF MATERIAL ISSUES. 
U.R.C.P. 5 (a), in part :quoted above was not followed. 
Rule 6 (d) and 7 (b) required motions shall be made 
in writing, and noti(•(• of hearing thereon shall be served 
not later than ;) days before the hearing. No notice of 
motion was given Nephi. 
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Rule 12 (d) provides a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings shall be determined before the trial on the ap-
plication of any party unless the court order that the 
hearing and determination thereof be deferred until the 
trial. If additional matters are considered, the motion 
shall be considered as one for summary judgment; and 
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to pre-
sent all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 
56. No motion was served on, or notice given Nephi of 
request for the judgment. 
S.aid Rule 56 (c) provides that a motion for summary 
judgment shall be served at least ten days before the time 
fixed for the hearing. No such motion or notice wag 
given. 
The judgment entered February :21, 1957 recites the 
matter ca1ne on regularly for trial on a different date 
than that set by the court, upon the pleadings reciting an 
admission of liability, .and the stipulations of other par-
ties than Nephi against whom the judgment was entered. 
But there is no minute of any trial. No record appears 
in the judgment of who appeared, who n1oved the court 
for the judg1nent, or who was and who was not repre-
sented. No findings of fact or conclusions were made 
or entered herein. 
If pleadings filed in Nephi ·s nan1e are of any effect, 
then the 1naterial issues tPndered by the pleadings not 
disposed are: (a) Pillsbury·s c01uplaint alleged its de-
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mand for an accounting hy Nephi for turkey proceeds. 
Onl:~ an approximate amount was given in Nephi'~ 
answer. It was not determined what if any amount was 
received to which Pillsbury was entitled; nor to whom 
the smne \Vas due. The accounting would show no sum 
on hand. (b) There was no adjudication of the arnount 
due and owing under the mortgage. (c) No amount was 
determined as owing frmn the mortgagee to the mort-
gagor .as a neces~ary condition before liability could fall 
upon Kephi. (d) Answer tendered issue there was no sum 
o\ving fron1 the 1\forleys to Pillsbury, and Nephi was en-
titled to have same tried. (e) Prayer was made for an 
order to protect Nephi; and whether or not Nephi was 
entitled to that order was not adjudicated. (f) Nephi and 
Morleys prayed for equity, .and no determination of the 
equities between the parties was made. (g) Morley ten-
dered issue that there remained due and owing on the 
mortgage a sum less than the amount which Pillsbury 
owed ~Lorleys; and prayed for judgrnent against Pills-
bury in a sum certain less any sun1 due .and owing under 
the said rnortgage. Nephi was ver:· much interested in 
those issues, and was entitled to have them adjudicated. 
·•A judgment without trial and determination 
of all the issues properly raised is erroneous. It 
is a general rule that the ***, findings, and judg-
ment must be as broad as the i~~lH'~ and must re-
spond to all issues of both law and fact, *** ." 
33 C.J., See. 8-1 ,p. 1135-6. 
"In view of the fact that the is~me was neither 
raised nor tried, in fairnes~ it should he sent back 
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for a new trial so that the parties will have a full 
opportunity to marshall and present whatever 
evidence they may be able to find relating to this 
issue." 
Fretz v. Anderson, 5 U.2d 290 at p. 302; 300 
P.2d 642. 
"No specified finding was made by the trial 
court on this matter; ***. Since the judgment \vas 
rendered on the basis of outstanding drafts, rather 
than the checks whose payment was wrongfully 
inddced by appellants, this case must be reversed 
and remanded for further proceedings." 
Farmers & Jlerch. Bank v. Universal C.l.T. 
Cr. Corp., 4l7.2d 155 at p. 160-1; 289 P. 2d 
1045. 
On Point YI, defendant submits that judgment 
should be vacated because of proceeding contrary to Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, for lack of trial, for failure to 
enter findings, and for failure to dispose of material 
issues. 
POINT VII. 
VACATION OF THE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFEND-
ANT DATED FEBRUARY 18, 1957; AND V A.CATION OF THE 
ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 21, 1957 OF DISMISSAL OF 
MORLEYS' CROSS-COMPLAINT SHOULD BE MADE AS 
DEFENDANT'S ·CLAIM AGAINST MORLEYS MAY BE RES 
ADJUDICATA AND DEFENDANT WILl. HAVE BORN A 
SUBSTANTIAL LOSS WITHOUT A REME:oy UNLESS VA-
CATED. 
ln defendant's motion for vacation of the judg1nent 
herein, one reason assigned was, that unless relief was 
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granted to defendant against the Morleys herein its claim 
against Morleys would probably be res adjudicata and 
defendant have no relief (R. 30). In defendant's tendered 
answer filed with its said n1otion defendant pleaded that 
if for any reason the offset of l\Iorleys' clain1 against 
plaintiff herein w.as not made herein, that in fairness de-
fendant is entitled to file a proper claim herein against 
the ~Iorleys and to be heard thereon (R. 48). To grant 
that relief, and to do equity Morleys should not be dis-
missed as parties hereto and the order dismissing them 
should be vacated. 
The affidavit of Dwight L. King urges the court to 
disregard this p.art of the record as another action of ac-
counting is pending between Lafe ::Morley, Ray Nielsen 
and ~L L. Harnwn and says he is informed this matter 
is a part thereof. Defendant never knew or had reason 
to believe this issue would ever arise ; and the issues 
therein were joined before judgment herein was entered. 
But when it appeared the trial court in the .above cause 
likely would not grant relief to defendant herein, a sup-
plemental pleading was filed in the accounting case on 
this judgment. Prornpt objection was made therein that 
the supplemental issue tendered was no part of the ac-
counting case, but should be settled herein; .and the trial 
judge on pre-trial indicated he regarded the matter as 
re.s adjudicata so far as that case was concerned (R. 51, 
53). Fnless relief is granted herein Nephi has wrongfully 
been imposed upon, has sustained substanial loss; and 
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likely will never have an opportunity to have its day .in 
court thereon. 
"Generally a judgment in favor of plaintiff 
is adjudication, not merely as to existence of 
plaintiff's cause of action, but as to non-existence 
of any defense thereto." 
Todaro v. Gardner, 3 U.2d 404; 385 P.2d 839. 
On Point VII, it is submitted that both the judgment 
in favor of Pillsbury and against Nephi and order of dis-
Inissal of the cross-complaint of the Morleys should be 
vacated and set aside; and Nephi permitted to plead 
against said Morleys herein. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. This was an action for the recovery of a debt or 
the enforcement of a right secured by a mortgage upon 
personal property. In absence of a stipulation by all par-
ties, the court should have determined the issues raised 
by the pleadings and adjudged the amount due if any. 
This was not done. 
2. Mere conversation of l\Ir. Harn1on with :Mr. King, 
and the latter's filing two papers in the nan1e of Nephi 
did not constitute his emploYJnent. The presumption that 
Dwight L. King was attorney for Nephi by filing of said 
pleadings herein, was overcmne by a denial of such em-
ployment by Nephi; repudiation by Nephi of the plead-
ings filed by attorney King in Nephi's name; and the ex-
press assertion by said attorney that he did not repre-
sent Nephi herein and his only interest herein was in the 
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cross-complainants, Lafe Morley and Callie Morley. 
Where judgrnent and order were entered without notice 
to defendant or knowledge by defendant of the likelihood 
thereof, and contrary assurances were given, the judg-
ment is of no force and effect and should be vacated. 
3. The interests of Nephi and Morleys conflicted. 
vVhen Dwight L. King determined he was going to plead 
in Nephi's name it held nwney for Pillsbury on a mort-
gage debt of the 11orleys, or for the Morleys if the mort-
gage were satisfied, and he did not obtain such informa-
tion fron1 the defendant's records or its officers, and he 
plead for Morleys such money was held by Nephi, that 
was a conflict of interest. He then had a duty to fully ad-
vise t.he parties thereof. He did not do so. King's duty 
was to advise Nephi he intended to sign a stipulation that 
Pillsbury could have a judgment against Nephi, and dis-
miss the case .as to the lVIorleys. His interest for :.Morleys 
was otherwise. Accordingly the pleadings filed herein 
in Nephi's name by Dwight L. 1\::ing are not binding on 
Nephi. 
4. Lack of notice to Nephi, failure of Pillsbury and 
Morleys to serve their pleadings on Nephi, and failure of 
Nephi to receive any information as to the progress of 
the case, having been assured it would be protected, sub-
stantially contributed to the error of the trial court enter-
ing judgment against Nephi and dismissing cause as to 
Morleys. Thereby Nephi did not have its day in court 
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and Nephi is in justice entitled to the opportunity to 
plead and be heard. 
5. The misrepresentation of facts to the defendant 
in November, 1953 by Morleys; and the reliance of de-
fendant upon the same and statements of Morley and 
l(ing that Nephi need not be concerned-it would be pro-
tected-are just and legal reasons why the judgment and 
order should be vacated. Failure of the trial judge t 1 
vacate the same was an abuse of discretion. Said judg-
ment and orders should be vacated, Nephi permitted to 
file its answer, and be gjven its day in court. 
6. The U. R. C. Pr. 5, 6, 12, and 56 (c) were not 
followed, and are applicable. If the pleadings in Nephi's 
name are of any force or effect against Nephi, then the 
following issues in the pleadings were not adjudicated: 
(a) issues on accounting for funds claimed to be in 
Nephi's hands and in which Pillsbury and :Jiorley~ 
claimed an interest; (b) the amount due on the mortgage 
debt; (c) issue on complaint and cross-complaint of what 
amount wa.s owing Pillsbury by 1\forleys, and the amount 
less than said amount to which Morleys were entitled 
to judgment against Pillsbury; (e) what orders Nephi 
was entitled to have entered against Pillsbury and Moi'-
leys for its protection; and (f) the equities between the 
parties. 
7. The judg1nent and order herein should be vacated 
so the clain1 of Nephi against the Morleys will not be res 
adjudicata for failure of the same to be determined here-
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in; .and to save an innocent party from paying the debt 
of another without recourse; and to prevent an unju~t 
enrichment of the Morleys herein. 
Respectfully sub1nitted this 8th day of January, 1958. 
UDELL R. JENSEN 
Of JENSEN & JENSEN, Lawyers 
Attorney for Defendant 
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